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MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND DEMOCRATIC CIVIL–
MILITARY RELATIONS 
 
Thomas C. Bruneau 
 
Introduction 
 The very existence of a ministry of defense (MOD) is an important basic indicator 
of the overall situation of civil-military relations in a country.  Although some of these 
ministries are but hollow shells with no power whatsoever, others have assumed 
increasingly important roles as catalysts and platforms in consolidating democratic civil – 
military relations.  This paper situates the founding and development of ministries of 
defense in historical context, namely the current era of democratization at the end of the 
Cold War; explains why they are created; and identifies conditions and actions required 
for the ministries to fulfill major roles and responsibilities in achieving effective and 
efficient defense while also ensuring democratic civilian control. 
 
 A MOD is currently a core element in democratic civil-military relations. This 
structure today is widely viewed as the solution to the classic, paradoxical problem “who 
guards the guardians?”  If the correct response is that the democratically elected civilians 
guard the guardians, then a MOD is the fundamental vehicle used for this control.  A 
MOD is the preferred mechanism to match the democratic legitimacy of the elected 
civilians with the professional expertise in armed conflict of the military.  Some of the 
most important issues in civil-military relations in the contemporary era of democratic 
consolidation are addressed in the form and functions of a MOD.  
 
 Despite the arguable importance of this topic, there is very little written about 
ministries of defense and democratic consolidation.  There is good material on the history 
and current dynamics of the U.S. Department of Defense, and while some of the lessons 
learned since its creation in 1947 are relevant elsewhere, civilian control over the armed 
forces was never the challenge in the United States that it has been for most of the so-
called new democracies.1  Although most of the central issues in civil-military relations 
are generic, and as such must be confronted in any democracy, the differences in history, 
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security environment, and institutional structures are so vast that the lessons learned in 
the older, more “mature” democracies are not fully relevant to the new democracies.  
There is nothing written analyzing what is required for a MOD to successfully combine 
the democratic legitimacy of politicians with the expertise of professional military 
officers.2  
 
In this paper I will draw data from observations in countries creating, or 
recreating, a MOD and interviews conducted with those involved.  I will illustrate main 
points with examples from several countries, as determined by the availability of 
information.  This efforts is, then, more deductive than inductive, being based on 
awareness of how institutions work, some basic research, and extensive experience in 
countries currently establishing their ministries of defense.3  This paper defines the 
themes and issues involved without extensive elaboration.  It is intended for policy 
makers in new and not so new democracies that want to learn how civilians can exercise 
control of the armed forces while also maintaining forces that can provide for the security 
and defense of the nation.  For researchers, if this framework seems appropriate, books 
could be written on important cases, such as Spain or South Africa, or a set of 
comparative studies.  
 
Conceptual Approach 
 In order to avoid the all too common error in studies of civil – military relations of 
misleading formalism, of confusing form with content, we must at least briefly define the 
conceptual approach to this topic.  An analysis of a bureaucracy such as a MOD must 
begin with Max Weber.  In his classic “Bureaucracy” Weber explains, “The decisive 
reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical 
superiority over any other form of organization.  The fully developed bureaucratic 
mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non–
mechanical modes of production.”4  While this statement is formally correct, and Weber 
elaborates on the conditions under which bureaucracies emerged, much hinges on the 
term “fully developed bureaucratic mechanism.”   The more recent literature in the theory 
of organizations, and particularly the sub-field of social science known as the “new 
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institutionalism,” takes us further and highlights a number of necessary considerations for 
the topic under study.  The more important of these considerations center on the often 
forgotten fact that bureaucracies, that are here referred to as institutions, are crafted by 
humans at particular times and with particular agendas or purposes in mind.  The scholars 
using this approach also look to the conditions under which these institutions develop or 
wither.  And, they analyze the “stickiness” of institutions.  Created at one time, they do 
not easily change.5 All of this is by way of caution: that one MOD does not equal another 
MOD.  It depends; we must be skeptical and analyze in some detail to grasp whether a 
MOD does or does not have power, and the real extent of its roles and reach.  In sum, the 
approach to analysis here looks at MODs as institutions that are either formal and without 
power and content, or are alive and dynamic with potential to continue to develop.  To 
allow us to situate a MOD in an historical and political space in order to analyze the 
conditions for creation and development, we must first briefly review the current political 
and military context.  
 
Current Context 
There are three main features or elements of the current global context that are 
most important.  The first is the spread of democracy.  The world continues to be riding 
on the so-called Third Wave of democratization that has seen dictatorships collapse, 
replaced by democracies of varying degrees of stability and popular participation.  Since 
1974 the world has experienced a continuing wave in which authoritarian regimes, where 
the armed forces were either the rulers or a key actor for the rulers, are replaced by 
democratically elected civilians.  While the debate continues on the definition of 
“democracy,” if we use the term “procedural democracy” (which means elections are free 
and fair and in fact determine who governs) then they have expanded from 27% of 
independent states in 1974 to 63% of the 192 independent countries in 2000.6  The 
continuing spread of democracies, then, is the first element in the current context.  Of 
particular importance in the consolidation of democracy is the issue of accountability; 
that is, the rulers are to some degree accountable to the citizens, those whom they rule.  
Once the concept of accountability is introduced, then immediately the issues of 
structures and processes also emerge.  By what means are the rulers held accountable?  
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My argument in this paper is that the accountability of the armed forces to democratically 
elected civilians is via a MOD, and thereby finally to the citizens.  If there is no MOD, or 
if it is but a façade there is simply not enough accountability to justify use of the term.7 
 
 The second, equally important and to a degree interdependent, element is the end 
of the Cold War.  The Cold War not only defined the strategic relationship between the 
U.S. and U.S.S.R. and their respective allies and enemies, with all the importance and 
danger that the nuclear and conventional relationship involved, defined virtually all 
security relationships, including domestic security, throughout the world.  The Cold War 
was fought in East and Central Europe, but also in Guatemala in 1954, Cuba after 1959, 
Chile in 1973, Angola in 1976, Afghanistan after 1979, and so forth, where East and 
West vied for ascendancy regionally and within countries.  While quite possibly 
stabilizing and avoiding global war involving the United States and the Soviet Union, on 
the periphery in most cases the Cold War accentuated regional tensions increasing the 
importance of the armed forces.  As a consequence, the armed forces assumed a greater 
role than would have otherwise been the case in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the 
Middle East for most of the period since 1945.  Indeed, they were the government in most 
of these regions for most of this period. 
 
 With the end of the Cold War the prior rationale for security, and specifically for 
the size and centrality of the armed forces, disappeared.   Today most armed forces are 
scrambling for justifications.  In the meantime, defense budgets have plummeted as have 
the sizes of the armed forces.  Universal male conscription is increasingly being 
abolished.  New alliances and coalitions, often with historical enemy states are publicly 
discussed.  In the midst of these changes, militaries are finding it difficult to define their 
current and future roles and missions.    
 
 The third and last element of the contemporary context is the international 
scramble for new relationships and new forms of influence in this democratizing, post -
Cold War, and increasingly global world.  If during the Cold War, nations, with the US 
and USSR at the lead, sought influence and ascendancy everywhere, nations and alliances 
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continue to do so today, but with different instruments and even different goals.  Today 
democracy and free market capitalism are on the defining characteristics.  The pressure is 
to spread them and consolidate them, although as dynamic multi-faceted processes it is 
difficult to define unambiguously that they are consolidated.  Today nations, international 
organizations, foundations, non-governmental organizations, and even individuals 
(George Soros, Bill Gates, and Ted Turner for example) are profoundly involved in 
providing models, resources, technical assistance, and the like to other, politically 
evolving, countries.  And, these links and mechanisms for influence are not the monopoly 
of the bigger and wealthy, but also extend to regional players, and organizations within 
them such as Spain, Switzerland, South Africa, and Argentina. 
 
 In sum, the global, regional, and in many countries domestic political context 
characterized by democratization, the end of the Cold War, and globalization is radically 
different today from what it was but a decade ago.   
 
The Previous Situation in Civil-Military Relations 
 To better understand the trajectories and challenges involved in establishing 
viable ministries of defense today, it is necessary to review briefly the situation in civil-
military relations prior to the democratic transitions.  By definition these governments 
were not democratic.  Elections were either not held at all or were formal and without 
effect.  Those in power did not rely on popular legitimacy for their positions.  Rather, 
they tended overwhelmingly to rule by force, possibly with reference to some kind of 
nationalism or other ideology, which required the capability and threat of repression. 8  
While some authoritarian regimes were run by civilians (Portugal, Spain, and the Soviet 
Union) and others by the military (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, and Nigeria) in 
virtually all cases the armed forces were a central element in the actual or potential use of 
repression.  In most, but definitely not all countries, the primary function of the armed 
forces was domestic control.  It could even be argued, with a certain amount of 
theoretical and empirical support, that the external conflicts these authoritarian regimes 
engaged in were largely due to their non-democratic characteristics.9 In sum, the armed 
forces had exaggerated or at least much expanded roles and positions in these regimes. 
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 The Cold War influenced virtually all military roles and missions and civil-
military relations in many parts of the World, and through surrogates in most other parts.  
By definition the “War,” while Cold, was still a war.  As such, it justified, or provided a 
rationale, for much expanded importance of the armed forces.  In a context of “War,” the 
armed forces could justify more resources, a high degree of autonomy, and influence or 
even veto power in a huge variety of areas of state, economy, and society. 
  
 In their inflated and exalted positions, the armed forces were not required to 
coordinate their activities, cooperate, or rationalize their use of resources.  After all, 
preparation for “War” can justify any level of funding and autonomy.  And, as 
authoritarian regimes, there was no public pressure to coordinate and economize in order 
to achieve effectiveness and efficiency.  These were largely alien concepts that did not 
figure into the very restricted, if any, debate in society.   
 
Ministries of Defense Are Common Today 
In the contemporary era most countries have created, or recreated under at least 
formal civilian control, ministries of defense.   For example, a MOD was created in Spain 
in 1977, in Portugal an old organization was redefined and brought under formal civilian 
control in 1982, and in Argentina it was brought under civilian leadership in 1988.   In 
much of Latin America this is a recent development with Nicaragua (1997), Honduras 
(1998), and Brazil (1999) having created MODs.  It must be stressed again that the mere 
presence of a MOD does not mean anything at all about civilian control.  Nor, for that 
matter, does having a civilian minister of defense mean much either.  In Portugal, up until 
the late 1980s, there was a MOD but it did not have any power.  In Nicaragua, today four 
years after its creation, it has no real power.  And, in East and Central Europe, where 
there were MODs, there was no guarantee of civilian control.  What I am mainly, but not 
exclusively, focusing on in this paper is the creation of MODs that have some potential of 
holding and exercising power. That is, of providing a central vehicle for democratic 
accountability of the military to elected civilians and ultimately to the citizens. 
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Why have new democracies created, or recreated under formal civilian control, 
ministries of defense now and not previously?  There are two main reasons for these 
developments.  First, they are following the example of other, more established, 
democracies where civilians exercise control over the armed forces and at the same time 
maximize military effectiveness and efficiency in the use of resources.  This could be 
termed the “demonstration effect” where there is awareness that the MOD is currently a 
near universal solution for civilian control of the armed forces combined with 
effectiveness and efficiency.  It is widely recognized that the armed forces, which hold 
the ultimate burden for national defense, rarely if ever acknowledge that they have 
enough money for equipment, troops, maintenance, and training.  If the armed forces 
were left to their own devices, which is most often the situation in authoritarian regimes, 
they work out deals or understandings among themselves whereby they inflate their 
demands.  This results in increased costs and lack of efficiency.  All of these problems 
are widely recognized, and as new democracies seek to bring their armed forces under 
control, and cut costs, a MOD appears as the most appropriate institution for these 
purposes. 
 
Admiral D. Angel Liberal Lucini, first sub-secretary of the Spanish Ministry of 
Defense between its founding in July 1977 and 1983, and then the first Chief of Defense 
Staff (JEMAD) the principal collaborator of the minister of defense, between 1984 and 
1986, made this point in an unpublished article and in an interview.10  He noted that prior 
to 1977 Spain was the only country in NATO‘s region (which Spain would join in 1983 
and reaffirm its membership in the 1986 referendum) without a ministry of defense, and 
he emphasized the negative effects of the previous complete independence of the three 
services.  The creation of the MOD, and the definition of its relations with the JEMAD, 
was an answer to both civilian control as well as effectiveness and efficiency.  And, in the 
case of South Africa, a participant and observer of the process of establishing the MOD 
writes as follows about the rationale for establishing the ministry: “When I asked the 
Chief of the South African Navy, Vice-Admiral Simpson-Anderson, of his feelings about 
the establishment of civilian control over the military, he said he welcomed the idea. This 
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was because in Western democracies there were established patterns of civilian control 
over the military, so South Africa had no choice but to follow suite.”11  
 
 Second, in recognition of the general validity of the point above, there is pressure 
from the more established democracies for the newer democracies to follow these 
models. This might be termed the “influence effect”.  Through regional security 
organizations and arrangements such as NATO and the Partnership for Peace, U.S. 
regional commander in chiefs, and the external defense and defense cooperation 
programs of the U.S. and European democracies, there is strong encouragement for all 
countries to establish effective ministries of defense.12   While, as noted above, little 
literature exists on the topic, there is however a widely-held but vague assumption that 
what has worked elsewhere, in the more established democracies, will also work in the 
new democracies.  Consequently, the creation of ministries of defense is on the agenda of 
international assistance and influence in democratic civil–military relations.  For 
example, Rudolf Joo, a former Hungarian Deputy Minister of Defense, lists seven 
societal, institutional, and procedural requirements constituting the democratic model of 
civilian control of the armed forces.  One of the seven requirements is as follows: “the 
hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government through a civilian organ of 
public administration – a ministry or department of defence – that is charged, as a general 
rule, with the direction/supervision of its activity.” 13  
 
Ministries of Defense Have Been Created to Achieve Four Main 
Purposes 
 Based on a review of the literature, but fundamentally on what I have observed in 
the new democracies attempting to deal with issues in civil – military relations, it appears 
that MODs have been created for four main purposes.  This is not to say that these 
purposes, singly or jointly were the beginning point or justification for their creation, but 
rather that they figured in at some point, often being discovered, after – the –fact, as 
purposes for the new or recreated institutions.  These four purposes are conceptually 
distinct, but like any social or political phenomena they are intertwined in reality. 
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 The first, and most obvious purpose for democratic civil – military relations, is for 
a MOD to structure the power relationships between the democratically elected civilians 
and the armed forces.  A MOD is the fundamental vehicle whereby relationships are 
institutionalized between those who hold the democratic right to rule, through the 
electoral process, and those who hold a monopoly on the means of violence.  How 
civilians in different countries attain this right, and whether they are in fact able to 
exercise it, varies tremendously, and the scholarly literature is as ambiguous on this point 
as it is broad.  But once the civilians have this right a if not the key issue in democratic 
consolidation is how to bring the armed forces under control.14  A MOD is the favored 
institutional mechanism in the contemporary era for this control.  Based on my research 
and especially on my direct observations in different parts of the world, I would go so far 
as to say that today without a MOD there can be no civilian control.  It is necessary but 
not sufficient for democratic civilian control.15  
 
 The second purpose is to sort out, or define and allocate, responsibilities between 
and among civilians and military officers.  It is less about civilian control and more about 
division of tasks and responsibilities.  This purpose may seem straightforward or simple, 
but it most definitely is not.  As proof of this one need only review the ongoing efforts by 
the two North American highly institutionalized democracies in sorting out these 
relationships.  The U.S. efforts in creating the Department of Defense, and defining its 
responsibilities with regard to the armed services, including the newly – created Air 
Force in 1947 were extremely complicated and highly political, and the national security 
system was modified or reformed at least twice in the following four decades.  The most 
recent reform, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, or Goldwater–Nichols as it is 
generally known, was equally complicated and political.  Indeed, it was virtually imposed 
by Congress over the resistance of the Department of Defense and some of the armed 
services. 16  One might anticipate the difficulty and drama in U.S. civil–military relations 
due to its superpower status and global involvement.  In contrast, one might Canada 
anticipate that relations between civilians and military officers will be more tranquil and 
simple in Canada.  Yet, the most respected Canadian student of defense issues concludes 
the following: “In Canada, civil–military relations are floundering and uncertain.  Recent 
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events have exposed the problem, but they are only the current manifestation of 
weaknesses long resident in the structure of the defense establishment….The relationship 
between the government and the defence establishment is troubled because political 
leaders have failed in their basic responsibility to supervise the armed forces of 
Canada.“17    
 
A key ingredient of this definition and allocation of responsibilities is the role of a 
MOD as buffer between politics and the armed forces.  The role of the MOD as buffer 
may be less obvious, especially for countries that are not familiar with elected political 
figures leading important state institutions.  The basic idea is that a political figure, 
selected through negotiations within the governing party if it has a majority or among the 
governing parties if there is a coalition in most parliamentary systems or appointed by the 
chief executive in presidential systems, can represent the needs of the armed forces to 
other political figures, particularly the finance or economics minister, and to the 
electorate in general.  If the armed forces seek to represent their own needs, which they 
did not need to do publicly in authoritarian regimes, they are seen prima facie as 
subjective and self–serving.   Thus having a civilian as the minister of defense can in fact 
be positive for the armed forces’ interests.  It is clearly positive for the democracy since it 
removes a complicating element in democratic legitimacy; that of having a non–elected 
organization using its bureaucracy, and quite possibly its control of violence, to influence 
or even blackmail politics.18 The negative implications of the politicization of the armed 
forces are obvious, and range from corrosion of democracy to civil war.  Mr. Alexei 
Arbatov, Vice Chairman of the Defense Committee in the State Duma, emphasized to me 
the negative aspects of not having such a buffer for both democracy and the armed forces 
in Russia.   He noted that the lack of a buffer kept the armed forces “in politics” and 
frustrated the ongoing efforts at military reform.19 
 
There are two core causes for the propensity for confusion and politicization in 
the relationship between democratically elected civilians and military officers that are 
exacerbated by the absence of a buffer.  The first is that the bases, or logics, behind their 
professions are totally different as so brilliantly recognized by Max Weber in his writings 
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on politics as a vocation and bureaucracy.20 Politicians in a democracy come into office 
on the basis of elections in which they make popular, and unrealistic, promises; and there 
is a tendency towards, as one would expect, politicization in order to both be elected and 
be reelected.  There is also a necessary vagueness in their fulfillment of promises since 
the specificity of any promise is quickly warped in the clash with economic and social 
reality.  Military officers in a democracy, on the other hand, have a totally different basis 
for their positions in office which is through a largely merit-based promotion system.  
Further, they are held responsible for often extremely serious issues of national defense, 
and as peoples’ lives, and expensive equipment are involved, precision and accuracy are 
emphasized.  Second, the armed forces are normally both a prominent national patriotic 
symbol and they hold a monopoly of the means of violence in a society.  This monopoly 
of violence is really what most distinguishes them as a profession from other professions 
and as a bureaucracy from other state bureaucracies.21 As such, they can offer obvious 
resources for politicians seeking ways to enhance their political positions.  To do so, for 
example by promoting or retiring officers for largely political reasons, is to disrupt the 
career progression of the merit - based promotion system, thereby politicizing the officer 
corps, and most likely decreasing the military capability of the armed forces.  MODs 
have thus been created in part to serve as a buffer - an institutional mechanism to define 
and structure the very different responsibilities of the democratically elected civilians and 
the military officers.  This purpose is really a further specification of the marrying of 
democratic legitimacy of the politician and professional expertise in armed conflict of the 
military.  
 
A third purpose in creating a MOD is to maximize the effectiveness in 
employment of the armed forces.  By effectiveness I mean the capacity to actually 
implement policies; in the case of the armed forces, to provide for the security and 
defense of the nation.   It is not only armed forces that, as bureaucracies, are slow to 
change, but they must surely be among the slowest due to their mission in national 
defense, career promotion structures, and huge investment in and lead time in developing 
new equipment.  This issue of effectiveness may have been of marginal importance in the 
past in many countries where there was either no real threat on the borders and where the 
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main function was to control and intimidate their own defenseless populations.  
Currently, with the end of the Cold War and its superpower alliance relations, and with 
the Third Wave of democratization and a general lessening of interstate wars, the utility 
of the armed forces with regard to other government functions is an open question.  
Consequently, in many countries there is wide-ranging debate on not only the future roles 
and missions of the armed forces but also on whether a country needs the armed forces at 
all.  With the built - in inertia of any established bureaucracy the effectiveness of 
redefining and implementing new roles and missions, or a new mix of them, cannot take 
place without another, higher level institution, playing the central role.22  This issue of 
effectiveness is particularly acute today, in the current environment of low interstate but 
considerable intrastate conflict as many countries are increasingly discovering 
peacekeeping or peacemaking roles as central to the justification of their armed forces.  
These missions, combining prominent roles for civilians, particularly in foreign 
ministries, are hard to imagine without a central role being played by a MOD.  This is 
obvious if we survey those countries that are most active in peacekeeping; they not only 
have had to resolve their inter–service rivalries but also clarify the central roles for 
civilian leadership.  In sum, the effectiveness of the armed forces in the current 
environment of international peacekeeping puts a premium on a MOD.  The MOD is the 
vehicle or basis for this wide-ranging and extremely dynamic coordination that is 
required for effectiveness. 
 
The fourth and last major purpose in creating a MOD is to maximize the 
efficiency in the use of resources – funds, personnel, and equipment – in these different 
and changing roles and missions.  By efficiency I mean the ability to achieve a goal at the 
lowest possible cost.  In the previous, pre–democratic phase, in many countries the 
different branches of the armed forces enjoyed tremendous independence.  Their missions 
often overlapped and they maintained separate supply and training programs.  If they 
cooperated at all it was to insure the greatest amount of resources for the separate 
services.  Most often their budgets were secret and even if they weren’t the population 
would have no influence over the allocations in any case.  Today, with democratization 
and globalization, both demanding transparency, the previously acquired privileges or 
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prerogatives are long gone.  With popularly elected governments that have to respond to 
the demands of sectors of the population, the armed forces can no longer enjoy the luxury 
of abundant resources.  With globalization, organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, 
NATO, and EU, individual states, and even individual investors demand convincing 
justification for any investment at all in national defense.  In the case of the European 
Union, this pressure is codified in the strict fiscal requirements of belonging to the 
European Monetary Union.  Consequently, with defense budgets dropping just about 
everywhere, the armed forces are pressured to be as efficient as possible.23  The vehicle 
whereby this is done, or at least where it is centered, is a MOD.  In the MOD the civilian 
politicians can implement programs to ensure budget transparency, act as arbiter, 
minimize duplication among the services, sell off unnecessary facilities, and negotiate 
with those seeking to sell equipment and services.  The MOD is the institution that 
employs lawyers, accountants, and planners to initiate and implement all of these 
programs.  That is, the MOD is the place to concentrate a wide variety of expertise in 
order to manage effectively and efficiently the defense and security of a nation.  
 
These four purposes are the most important that I have been able to identify as 
justifying, implicitly or explicitly, sooner or later, the creation of MODs.  I have never 
seen anything written that elaborates them together in this manner, but when the 
researcher stands back and reviews what is being said and done, normally over a period 
of at least a decade, these four purposes emerge as the most critical reasons or purposes 
to create a MOD.  Taken together they can be summarized as follows: armed forces that 
are capable of providing for the nation’s security and defense and under civilian control.   
 
There are other possible purposes.  One, for example, is to balance out relative 
weights of the services.  In all authoritarian regimes the army was the dominant service, 
if only because it provided the force for internal control.   In the transitions the other 
services are particularly eager to have a MOD that can right this balance.  And, with the 
redefinition of roles and missions, the other services are indeed much more important 
than in the past.  Thus a MOD is created in order to better promote what is termed 
“jointness” in the U.S.   
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However, it is one thing to create a MOD, and quite another to provide it with 
sufficient legal authority, financial and personnel resources, and power to fulfill these 
purposes.  In fact so far very few of the MODs in the new democracies possess these 
essential requirements.   Greece, Portugal and Spain clearly do.  I think this has much to 
do with both the relatively early transitions, or in the case of Greece, return, to democracy 
in these three countries combined with membership in NATO (after 1983 for Spain) and 
in the European Union. In these three Southern European democracies the advanced 
development of the MODs is due to the length of time combined with pressure and 
support from NATO and the EU, and their ancillary organizations.  Available literature 
and my interviews show that the MODs in Russia, Taiwan, and Thailand clearly do not 
meet the minimal requirements to function as real MODs.24 From my experience nor do 
the MODs in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Others, such as Argentina, Brazil, 
South Africa, and Romania are somewhere in between.  
 
The Primary Competencies of a MOD and Its Relations with Other 
Institutions 
 If a MOD is to fulfill one or more of these four main purposes it must be 
endowed, or empowered, with a number of primary tasks, functions, or competencies.  
Further, its relations with other agencies must place it in a position of relative power.  
This section is divided into two main subdivisions.  They review first the key 
competencies and then the most important relations to be specified.  The following is 
based on the experiences in established democracies and the lessons being learned in the 
newer democracies, both positive and negative.   
 
 1. Key Competencies 
 There are at a minimum four key competencies for a MOD.  These four are 
necessary if a MOD is to be able to fulfill the above purposes.  The competencies are in 
the areas of budgets, personnel, acquisitions, and definition of roles and missions. If a 
MOD does not have power or authority in these areas, it is but a shell, and without much 
significance.   
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 a. Budgets.  It is trite, but true, that the “power of the purse” is the basis of civilian 
control of the armed forces.  In authoritarian regimes the defense budgets (and probably 
other budgets as well) were secret, and the funds went directly to the armed forces with 
virtually total autonomy to allocate within the services and other departments.  25  In 
many countries the system was especially pernicious as funds for the troops would be 
allocated to a local commander with no oversight on how the money was in fact used.  
One hears of many cases where the commander would minimize the funds for the troops’ 
food, clothing, equipment, and training, and simply pocket it.  
 
The challenge is, how to move from this situation to one where a civilian – 
controlled MOD assumes responsibility for allocation and oversight?  Based on my 
observations, it is a very gradual process in which a MOD and Ministry of Finance, or 
equivalent, absorb the budget functions from a general staff and divide them between 
these two ministries.  The Ministry of Finance provides the general allocations among the 
ministries, and the MOD provides the allocations within the defense sectors.  This 
immediately brings up the issue of how to do it, and while there are no panaceas, and the 
programming, planning, budgeting system (PPBS) is clearly not the solution it is often 
made out to be (due to the huge requirements for data and objective systems to make it 
work), some kind of system is necessary.  At a minimum the adopted system must 
guarantee transparency, provide justification for funding categories and funding at a 
certain level, and accountability.   It has struck me that in many of the countries I visit 
there is apparently no perceived link between the population’s paying taxes and providing 
resources to the government in general, and what the government, including the armed 
forces, do with these resources.  Until the population comes to demand accountability, 
and there must obviously be some prior opening by the government for this to begin, 
there will not be accountability throughout the system.  All of this requires an active civil 
society and a free and energetic media.  In Portugal, Spain, and Argentina their MODs 
have in fact assumed control of the budgets within the defense sector, thereby allowing 
the civilians to in fact control the armed forces.26  I have it on secondary evidence that 
this is also the case in South Africa.   
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b. Definition of Roles and Missions. Roles and missions, theoretically embedded 
in a strategy, are the bases for what the armed forces are all about.  Roles and missions 
define why the military exists at all.  This is particularly obvious today at the end of the 
Cold War, in the midst of the Third Wave, and with the multi-faceted phenomenon of 
globalization.  What are the forces to be used for and under what conditions?  It is clearly 
not what they were supposed to be used for during the Cold War or during the 
authoritarian regimes.  These are issues that are debated everywhere there is an openness 
and sufficient knowledge for a debate.  In the end, in a democracy, it should be the 
democratically elected civilians who determine the strategy and the purposes of the 
forces.27  This responsibility becomes particularly crucial today with the ambiguous, 
heavily civilian oriented, missions in peacekeeping.  These missions are of particular 
interest to civilians not only as an issue of civilian control of the armed forces, but also 
because involvement in peacekeeping missions is an unwritten but widely understood 
requirement for membership in the ranks of responsible nations.  Thus it is all the more 
crucial for civilians to be aware, be in charge, and actually determine strategy and roles 
and missions.  
 
Generally the same point can be made regarding what are loosely termed ‘military 
missions in support of civilian authorities’.  These missions range from disaster relief – 
volcanoes, floods, earthquakes, etc., riot control, counter-drugs, and internal insurrection.  
For obvious reasons, the latter examples on this list are extremely sensitive and may be 
perceived as a return to the “bad old days.”  These missions thus require very clear 
guidance, based on law and exercised through robust structures and processes, to ensure 
that the military execute the tasks without usurping power.  Again, the MOD should have 
responsibilities in determining when and how to use the armed forces for these domestic 
missions.  
 
 c. Personnel. The issue of armed forces personnel is more complicated than it 
might appear initially.  Here the reference is to both officers and enlisted personnel in the 
forces.  If the armed forces were sized in the context of the Cold War and 
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authoritarianism, then the sizing and training in the current context will of necessity be 
very different.  The problem is, it is impossible to know a priori how they will be 
different unless roles and missions are first defined.  Also, there are political and career 
structure considerations that impinge on these decisions.  The main point is, however, 
that there are decisions to be made, that the past is not the future, that inertia should not 
be allowed to rule, and the decisions on personnel and training should be made in the 
MOD.  It is difficult to know about the sizing and training for the forces unless it is 
known what they will be used for. The political concerns include, on the one hand, 
pressure in a democratizing society to abolish conscription and allocate fewer funds to 
defense and more funds to social areas; and on the other hand, concern to not alienate the 
armed forces by cutting them too far and too quickly.  There was awareness of the latter 
in Spain, but apparently not in Russia.   The career structure considerations relate to both 
political concerns and morale.  The number of senior officers, generally colonel and 
above, optimally depends on the number of troops, thus to cut down the size of the force 
should, logically, result in fewer senior officers. However, for political and morale 
reasons, the upper ranks may not be reduced, at least not quickly and proportionally, 
thereby causing problems of morale in the lower ranks, having “hollow forces”, using up 
more resources than necessary for salaries for the higher ranks. 
   
The issue of conscription versus an all-volunteer force (AVF) is also not as simple 
as it may appear initially.  In the contemporary era, there may seem to be little reason for 
conscription.  Indeed, as practiced in the US during the war in Southeast Asia, and 
Colombia today, there is much to argue for AVF on the basis of equity as well as 
effectiveness.  However, in some countries issues of costs, ethnic diversity, and nation 
building may overwhelm the arguments against conscription.  For example, in 
Mozambique the argument for conscription is cogently based on the need for national 
integration.  The general point to be made here is that there are many considerations 
involved in personnel, including in force structure, and the past is not necessarily a good 
guide for the future.  Given the inherent conservatism of bureaucracies, and especially 
military bureaucracies, these decisions should be made at a more general, and higher, 
level, which is at the level of the MOD. 
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 d. Acquisitions and Facilities.  There are at least two generalizations that can be 
made regarding acquisitions in defense: they are very expensive and the lead time 
between when they are purchased or borrowed and finally put into use is great.  It is thus 
all the more important that a system be put in place to most efficiently determine and 
acquire the most appropriate equipment.  Again, the appropriateness must be determined 
by the missions for which the equipment, and the forces, will be committed, and this 
requires attention to making decisions.  Acquisitions often lead to graft and corruption, so 
the system must be especially rigorous.  Again, it is difficult to see how the armed forces 
alone can achieve these levels of systems and robustness.  Management of facilities is an 
emerging issue both because of the different requirements that vary by different uses for 
the forces and the fact that armed forces often accumulate installations over the years. 
The issue becomes how to most effectively sell off, or give away, no longer useful, or 
utilizable, facilities and acquire new ones or convert old ones to meet new needs.  This 
issue obviously requires attention at a level above the services in order to make the best 
use of the existing facilities, convert them, or sell them and use the resources for other 
purposes.  It is obviously easy to imagine the opportunities for graft and corruption in 
selling off real estate in areas that have appreciated tremendously.  And, there are also 
huge implications for local politics if facilities are closed and employees lose their jobs.  
Apparently good progress has been made in Argentina and Portugal in this area. 
 
The overall point is, therefore, that much of what is being discussed here – in 
personnel, acquisitions, and installations – that things are new and different, requiring 
new ideas and systems, and a new organization, a MOD, would appear to be the most 
appropriate organization to deal with them.  
 
 These four key competencies are obviously not monopolies of a MOD.  Indeed, 
they are initially not even competencies of the MOD as either there is no MOD or it has 
not yet acquired them.  Initially there is a lack of an institutional basis and expertise to 
exercise the hypothetical competencies.  But, they must be acquired if the MOD is to 
fulfill the purposes defined the section above.  But, while acquiring them and continuing 
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to build them, another series of issues must be dealt with which are to define relationships 
with key elements of the domestic political system, the armed forces, and international 
actors.   
 
 2. Relations to be Defined and Clarified 
 It is obvious that a MOD does not emerge fully formed out of a new democratic 
political system.  Rather, there is a tremendous amount of institutional engineering 
required to build the MOD and endow it with the four competencies listed above.  This 
same point clearly pertains to other democratic institutions such as the legislature, courts, 
political parties, regional and local governments, and organizational components of civil 
society.  The institutional engineering is not limited to structures and processes within the 
MOD, but also to its relations with other key components or actors, which are also 
developing.  At a minimum, these must include the executive, of which it is a part, the 
legislature, the armed forces, and relevant international actors. 
 
a. The Executive.  The MOD is part of the executive. Obviously there are critical 
differences in the structures of relations in presidential versus parliamentary systems.  
The generalizations here are meant to apply to both types of democratic political systems, 
and are thus even more generic.  The fundamental issue is one of power, as it is indeed in 
all aspects of civil – military relations.  The question that must be asked is: does the 
MOD, as an institution and the MOD as individual, have a central position in the power 
structure of a country, or is the MOD only a façade and the minister a political nobody?  
If the MOD is not integrated into the cabinet with clear lines of authority radiating from 
the president or prime minister, and if the minister of defense is not politically powerful, 
then the MOD by definition is not a player in the political system.   This is particularly 
important because building a MOD is clearly a case of institution building, when there 
was nothing previously.  If the MOD as institution, and MOD as individual, are not 
closely linked to power, then either the armed forces continue to enjoy a great deal of 
autonomy or there is some other institution in the executive branch that holds the power.  
Based on my observations and readings, this other institution is the ministry of finance, 
treasury, or its equivalent.  While this “power of the purse” may indeed control the 
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military, most likely by starving it for resources, it does nothing for the two other goals or 
purposes of effectiveness and efficiency.  The ideal situation, at least in a new 
democracy, is one in which the MOD as institution and minister as individual is 
integrated into the structure of power in the government and holds the personal 
confidence of the executive.  In this way the armed forces know they are taken seriously 
on the one hand, and know on the other hand that they must deal with the MOD and not 
attempt to avoid its control.  This was the situation in both Portugal and Spain in the 
critical period of the early 1980s.  In Greece Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou also 
held the position of minister of defense.  In Nicaragua in contrast, ever since President 
Violeta Chamorro gave up the minister of defense position in November 1996, it has 
been occupied by weak political figures.  In fact, over the past five years it has been 
occupied by five different weak political figures, including her son Pedro twice. 
 
b. The Legislature.  There are extremely important differences between a 
presidential and parliamentary system in regard to the role of the legislature.  28 And, 
again, the general points here apply despite the different forms of political systems.  The 
most important point, or consideration, is to broaden the interest in or concern with the 
armed forces, and national security and defense, beyond a relatively small group in the 
executive.  We must recall the background was one in which few civilians had any 
interest in or opportunity to deal with the armed forces.  There was no advantage to such 
an interest, and it could be very dangerous.  By broadening the possibility of control to 
the legislature not only are there more structural means for involving another body but 
personal ones as well to interest a broader group of politicians.  The former point speaks 
to the issue of effectiveness; to have another institution interested and involved, and the 
latter speaks to preparing a cadre of politicians who can specialize in the armed forces, 
security, and defense.  How this may be done is illustrated by Portugal, Spain, and 
Argentina where defense committees were created with some powers of policy and 
oversight, which encouraged the members to become interested and involved.  This is 
currently happening as well in Brazil.  Later, at least in Portugal, a member of the defense 
committees became the minister of defense.  This of course is common in the U.S. where 
the two most recent administrations, those of President George Bush, 1989 -- 92 and 
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William Clinton, 1992 – 2001, nominated former members of the Congress as their 
Secretaries of Defense.   
 
c. The Armed Forces.  Obviously the relations between the MOD and the armed 
forces will have to be defined, with democratically elected civilians clearly in charge.  
Specifically what is meant here is the relationship between the MOD and the top ranks of 
the armed forces, generally constituted as a joint or general staff, or even as a joint 
general staff.  There are a variety of relations to be clarified at this level since, in most 
cases, the MOD is taking over roles from the joint staff, and the central issue is what the 
MOD takes on and what is left with the joint staff.  From my observations, the two main 
relations that must be clarified concern nominations for the highest military positions 
(assuming the executive nominates and the legislature approves) and operational roles.  
How are nominations for senior officers handled?  Does the MOD play a central role in 
handling the candidates and making the nominations, or are nominations done strictly by 
the joint staff?   If the MOD plays a central role then it will influence not only the 
character of the higher officer ranks but also influence the behavior of those who aspire 
to higher ranks.  I became aware of this role in Spain, and it was pointed out to me in the 
context of asserting civilian control over the armed forces.  Spanish officers are very 
much aware that their career possibilities are related to their (non) political behavior.  
These are the new rules of the game that must be asserted, likely tested, and subsequently 
reaffirmed and institutionalized.  The issue here is not the power of the executive, the 
president or prime minister, to promote or retire, which is a first sign of civilian control, 
but rather the proper management of personnel, including promotion of the best qualified 
officers to the highest positions.   
 
The second issue, that of operational roles, concerns the division between the 
MOD and the joint staff for command responsibility in peace, but also in war.  Has the 
MOD assumed the “support” roles of budgets, equipping, personnel management, 
training, and the like, and the joint staff taken on operational roles?   I have found that 
this issue is clarified in the more advanced new democracies, such as Portugal and Spain, 
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but is much less clear in the newer new democracies such as Russia, Brazil, and 
Nicaragua.  
 
d. International Actors.  There are an incredible number and variety of 
international actors involved in international defense and security, including civil – 
military relations.  The issue here is – who deals with them?  Do the armed forces, as 
services or the joint staff at the peak of the services, deal directly with them?  Does the 
executive, or maybe even the legislature, deal with them?  Or, does the MOD have at 
least initial responsibility to interact with these international actors?  I would argue that if 
the MOD can monopolize the role as initial contact then it can increase its roles by 
mobilizing all types of resources: financial, personnel, training, and grants of equipment.  
These international actors include other countries’ MODs, visiting flag rank officers and 
officials, United States regional commander in chiefs, organizations such as NATO and 
Partnership for Peace, the Foreign Military Finance & International Military Education 
and Training and other programs from the US, and so forth.  The myriad of international 
donors, the coordination of which is minimal even for one country let alone among 
several countries, offer real resources, providing the MOD can create structures and 
processes for dealing with them.  From my experience, very few MODs are in this 
position.  Indeed, in most cases the services are still in the lead and there is little 
coordination.  Or, in contrast, during President Fujimori’s tenure as president of Peru, he 
personally approved every international activity.  While he personally used this, and other 
means, to assert personal control, it did not make for effectiveness or efficiency of the 
armed forces.  
 
 Unless and until at least these four sets of relationships are clarified, the MOD 
will be unable to fulfill one or more of the purposes for which they are created.  Clearly, 
defining and finally managing these four relationships takes knowledge and qualified 
personnel, two resources that a new MOD is unlikely to possess.  If, however, an initial 
commitment is made, then the MOD can develop as it reworks these relationships to its 
institutional advantage.  This has been done in Portugal and Spain, has gone fairly far in 
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Argentina, is just beginning, but on the right track in South Africa and Brazil, has not 
gone anywhere at all in Nicaragua, and is regressing in Venezuela.  
 
 A MOD will not be born, or reborn, with all of the key competencies and 
relationships defined, let alone developed.  These eight elements are all by way of 
structures and processes that must be encouraged and finally institutionalized.  In the 
more “mature” democracies such as France and the United States the adjustments, while 
important, are at the margins.  In the older “new democracies” of Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain they have achieved a reasonable level of development in these eight areas.29  
Argentina, South Africa, and the new NATO members of Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland are well along.  Brazil is just beginning, but the situation is promising, as is the 
case in El Salvador.  Russia remains mired in disorganization and Honduras and 
Nicaragua are barely even defining the issues. 30 
 
Initial Requirements to Begin to Achieve the Institutional Development 
A MOD, like any institution, will grow or decline, depending on its founding 
conditions and ongoing support or opposition.  Based on my observations in the United 
States, Portugal and Spain, and in several of the even newer democracies, there are three 
basic and necessary initial requirements to allow a MOD to begin to take on the kind of 
institutional life hypothesized throughout this paper.  These are as follows: First, 
workable structures and processes, supported by legal status and resources; second, 
informed and responsible civilians with an expectation of some degree of permanence in 
their positions; and third, a mechanism to include in the MOD military officers with their 
professional backgrounds and expertise.  These are all fairly obvious requirements and I 
will only briefly describe them here.  
 
 The creation of structures and processes is a minimum requirement for any 
institution.  This demands a foundation in law for the institution and at least a basic initial 
definition of what its competencies and relations will be.  This should be embodied in 
something akin to an organic law, often following from the constitution, which must also 
define relationships to other institutions.  The new MOD will also require something as 
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simple, but also as fundamental, as facilities.  In the more successful instances of 
institutional development that I have observed these facilities, and there is an important 
element of symbolism here, are located in the facilities originally inhabited by the 
services or joint staff.  It has been interesting to observe over the years how the MODs in 
Portugal, Spain, and Argentina first moved into these building and then expanded from 
one floor to another.  This is currently happening in Brazil as well.  In other countries, 
however, such as Nicaragua, the small size and marginal location of the facilities make it 
clear that the MOD is inconsequential.  Honduras is interesting as the new minister of 
defense in 1999 had to forcefully take over the office of the commander of the armed 
forces, whose position had been abolished, which was occupied by the vice commander.  
Finally, and obviously, the MOD must have resources; that is, funds.  I am not referring 
only to the funds to support the MOD itself, which need not be great, but also to its 
purview over resources for the armed forces in general.  In short, it must have some 
initial control otherwise the joint staff will maintain its monopoly over the allocation of 
resources for the armed forces. 
 
The MOD will require a professional civilian staff with some expectation of 
stability.  As frequently reiterated above, in the past the realms of national defense and 
the armed forces were the monopoly of the armed forces.  Yet, if democratic legitimacy 
is to be implemented in an overall system of civil–military relations, civilians will have to 
be included in key positions in the MOD.  The dilemma, not surprisingly is that initially 
there are few if any civilians who know anything about defense. Therefore, at least 
initially, civilians from other ministries, academics, lawyers, accountants, and the like 
will have to be recruited into the MOD and provided with the means to learn on the job 
and through courses in country, and abroad, about these issues.  These training programs 
are available, indeed I am the director of a center that exists to provide them, and it is a 
matter of taking the best advantage of these courses. 
 
There is a further, almost insurmountable problem, however, in that in most new 
democracies there is the noxious combination of the absence of a civil service system 
providing career stability and politicization of most government positions.  There is, 
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therefore, most frequently no prospect for stability in government employment because it 
is likely that the positions are filled for political reasons by the executive.  Unless these 
problems are confronted and to some degree resolved there is little hope that the 
necessary prepared civilians can be attracted and retained even if they are trained through 
some combination of international courses and on the job training.31  
 
 The third requirement, which is the issue of including both retired and active duty 
officers in the MOD, is more complicated than might appear initially.  If, as is frequently 
the case in most new democracies, the MOD is staffed with active duty or retired officers, 
then there are fewer opportunities and incentives to include civilians.  This is frequently 
justified as a stopgap measure, but can easily become a permanent “solution” to the 
problem of informed personnel in the MOD.  In Guatemala, for example, the only 
civilians in the MOD are the janitorial staff.  This is the negative side of the involvement 
of officers, active duty or retired, in the MOD, and it concerns not only occupying 
positions that civilians might occupy but also general orientations.   After spending their 
careers in the armed forces in most of these countries, many of which lack vibrant civil 
societies and diverse economic options, they are still essentially military officers with 
other officers, active duty or retired as friends and the culture of military officers.   My 
point here is not to preclude using active duty and retired officers, but to balance them 
with civilians.  
 
The positive side of involving retired officers in the MOD is highlighted 
paradoxically by the oft - noted negative example of Nicaragua where there were, when I 
last visited in 1999, only civilians in the MOD.  The problem was, these civilians knew 
virtually nothing about defense or the armed forces.  The joint staff basically handled all 
of these issues and the civilians didn’t seem to know the difference.  There is, then, a 
convincing argument that can be made to include officers, both active duty and retired, in 
the MOD in order to draw on their professional expertise.  But, it must be done 
consciously with the goal to achieve a balance between military and civilians, and with a 
plan to encourage them to train the civilians.  This is basically the system in the U.S. 
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Department of Defense, and was explicitly followed in both Portugal and Spain.  It would 
appear to be the plan currently being implemented in South Africa and Brazil.   
 
Responsibilities for Future Initiatives 
 Whether there is a MOD or not, whether it possesses scant or abundant resources 
initially, and the nature of its competencies and relationships, will depend on the 
initiative of the executive and possibly the legislature.   Yet nothing is static and MODs 
in the Southern European democracies, new members of NATO, Argentina, and South 
Africa have accumulated new competencies and (re) defined their relations with other 
political institutions and foreign actors.  They have accumulated them due to their 
founding statutes, the efforts of strong early leaders in the MODs, or some kind of 
bureaucratic dynamic.  The issue at hand is the degree to which the MOD itself has a role 
in initiating and formalizing these new and changing roles, especially in the legal realm.   
Here the issue is whether or not the MOD has the capacity to formulate or change the 
following levels of legislation which are listed from the most general to most specific: 
changes in the constitution relating to the MOD and the armed forces; an organic law or 
laws for the MOD itself and possibly the general staff; regular legislation passed by the 
legislature; and ongoing policy initiatives of the executive.  Some MODs, such as 
Brazil’s, are acquiring these legal initiatives, whereas others, such as Guatemala, have no 
power of initiative at all.  From my observations, in most countries there is little 
awareness of the importance of having this power of initiative.  Again, if an institution 
has the initiative in defining its future legal status, then it can better accumulate roles and 
establish itself as a viable institution in the constellation of powers including the 
executive, legislature, and armed forces.   
 
In sum, there are at least these three initial requirements that must be dealt with to 
increase the chances that the MOD will become a dynamic institution capable of 
fulfilling the purposes for which they are typically created.  All of these require resources 
– political, personnel, and financial – and there are only so many resources to go around 
in any democracy, particularly new ones.  However, if the political leaders are not 
committed to developing the institution of a MOD, and providing it with these resources, 
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then it is difficult to imagine how democratic civil – military relations can be established 
and maintained.   
 
Conclusion 
 This paper is mainly about the politics of the management of defense. In the 
contemporary process of democratic consolidation, the issues of civil–military relations 
become less about the likelihood of military coups (although in many cases including 
Ecuador, Indonesia, Paraguay and Philippines, this possibility remains relevant) and more 
about institutionalizing effective and durable relations between democratically elected 
civilians and the armed forces.  It is about how to manage, to cope with, the difficult 
relationship between democratic legitimacy and professional military expertise.  Based 
on the observed experience of a number of new democracies, there are similar reasons for 
creating an effective MOD, and a common series of responsibilities that must be defined 
and implemented.  In order to achieve this, there is another set of requirements that must 
be initially undertaken which demand a substantial commitment of a variety of resources.  
If policy makers are interested in achieving civilian control of the armed forces and 
maintaining credible forces, this paper can serve as an inventory of what is required.  It 
must be recognized that policy makers may not be interested in either of these goals.  If 
so, this paper allows for assessments on what has not been done.  But, if policy makers 
want to achieve these two goals, the domestic resources of political capital, energy, 
funds, and personnel can be supplemented by international resources in training and 
education.  There is really no mystery to institutional development; it just requires will, 
knowledge, and resources. 
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